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RECENT DECISIONS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES PERMITTING SEARCHES
WITHOUT WARRANT BY HEALTH AND SAFETY INSPECTORS ARE UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL UNDER FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. Lessee of
ground floor of apartment building was convicted of violating San Fran-
cisco Housing Code by refusing to permit warrantless inspection of his
premises by a health and safety inspector. Held, judgment vacated. Ad-
ministrative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors constitute
significant intrusions upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 87
S. Ct. 1727 (1967). 1
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The development of industrial society and the growth of large cities
have given rise to may social problems requiring the intervention of gov-
ernment. Much of what was once regarded as strictly private, such as the
cleanliness of a person's home, has been brought into the domain of public
regulation because of abuses that demand correction for community wel-
fare.. Nearly all state and municipal codes sanction warrantless inspec-
tion of private dwellings by health inspectors, building inspectors, fire
inspectors and other such officials.2 A Montana statute is typical:
The state fire marshal, his deputies and subordinates, the chief
of the fire department of each municipality where a fire department
is established, or the county sheriff where no fire department exists,
at all reasonable hours may enter into all buildings and upon all
premises within their jurisdiction for the purpose of determinining
whether the building or premises conforms to the laws and rules re-
lating to fire hazards and fire safety.3
The unqualified right granted by such statutes to enter all buildings
'See v. City of Seattle, 87 S.Ct. 1737 (1967), was decided by the Supreme Court
on the same day as Camara. The dissenting opinion of Justices Clark, Harlan and
Stewart to both cases appears at 87 S.Ct. 1741. In the See case a warehouse owner
was convicted of violating Seattle Fire Code by refusing to submit to fire inspection
without a search warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
"only the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment -
that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure - is applicable . . .
to business as well as to residential premises." In the majority opinion, Justice
White stated: "We do not imply that business premises may not reasonably be
inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question such
accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior
to operating a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to
such programs can only be resolved . . . on a case-by-case basis under the general
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness." Id. at 1741. Because the See
holding is narrow in an area where the scope of governmental regulation is broad,
and most of the problems raised by the decision remain to be answered on a case-
by-case basis, the discussion here is limited to the Camara case-the requirement
of a warrant for an administrative search of residences.
'The enactments differ in detail but are largely uniform in the kind of authority
they confer. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
246 (1966).
3REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 82-1218 (Supp. 1967).
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for an administrative inspection is in question in Camara v. San Fran-
cisco. The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The question is whether statutes authorizing administrative inspections of
private dwellings at reasonable times without a search warrant violate
the Fourth Amendment guarantee of right of privacy.
The question was first raised in 1950 in District of Columbia v. Little,4
but the constitutional issue was expressly avoided by a majority of the
court because the case could be decided on other grounds.5 In a dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Burton, with whom Justice Reed joined, discussed the
constitutional issue saying that the "reasonable, general, routine, ac-
cepted, and important character" of the health inspection squared fully
with the requirements of the Constitution.6
The constitutional issue could not long be avoided as more states and
municipalities authorized warrantless administrative inspection. It was
finally met nine years later in Frank v. Maryland.7 The case arose under
a Baltimore ordinance providing that
[w]henever the Commission of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar, or enclosure, he may de-
mand entry therein in the daytime, and if the owner or occupier shall
refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he
shall forfeit and pay for each refusal the sum of twenty dollars.8
Acting on a complaint from a resident that rats were infecting her base-
ment, a health inspector was dispatched to inspect the houses in the
neighborhood. He was refused permission to inspect Frank's basement.
Shortly thereafter, Frank was arrested, convicted and fined twenty dol-
lars. In a five to four decision the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the inspection.
"District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
5
Miss Little was charged with interfering with a health inspector in the course of
his duty. Justice Black, speaking for six members of the Court, was of the opinion
that "mere refusal to unlock the door accompanied by remonstrances on substantial
constitutional grounds was not the kind of interference prohibited by the regulation."
Justice Black applied the "sound general policy against deciding constitutional
questions if the record permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional
grounds. '' Id. at 3-6. A finding in the Court of Appeals was also in favor of Miss
Little, but was decided there squarely on constitutional grounds. Judge Prettyman
stated: "If private homes are opened to the intrusion of government enforcement
officials, at the wish of those officials, without the intervening mind and hand of
a magistrate, one prop of the structure of our system is gone and an outstanding
characteristic of another form of government will have been substituted." 178 F.2d
13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'District of Columbia v. Little, supra note 4, at 7.
'Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
8BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. XII, § 120. Cited in Frank v. Maryland, supra note 7,
at 361.
[Vol. 29
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Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter reviewed the histori-
cal backgr6und of the Fourth Amendment concluding that the searches
which the framers had sought to proscribe were those for evidence of
crime or for goods subject to confiscation.9 Justice Frankfurter was not
only impressed by the fact that the inspections were designed to protect
vital community interests, but also by the reasonableness of the inspection
procedure.
Valid grounds for suspicion of the existence of a nuisance must exist.
... Here was no midnight knock on the door, but an orderly visit
in the middle of the afternoon with no suggestion that the hour was
inconvenient.' 0
A search warrant should not be issued, in Frankfurter's view, be-
cause the standards for issuance of a warrant would have to be consider-
ably reduced from those needed for a warrant in criminal cases, thus
leading to a "synthetic search warrant.""
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan joined Doug-
las in dissent. Five basic propositions were advanced by them to justify
including the administrative search by health and safety inspectors within
the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment: (1) History shows that the
Fourth Amendment has a much wider frame of reference than mere
criminal prosecutions ;12 (2) The Court has continually emphasized that
a search without a warrant can be made only in exceptional circum-
stances,' 3 and the concept of extraordinary situations can apply to ad-
ministrative searches as well as to searches for evidence of crime ;14 (3)
Police officers might be encouraged to utilize health inspectors to search
for evidence of crime in the guise of a health inspection; 15 (4) The re-
quirement of a warrant would not imperil the public health program
since refusals to co-operate are extremely rare; 16 and (5) The warrant
will not be "synthetic" since it will be issued only when a person refuses
to permit warrantless inspection, and a judicial officer authorizes the
inspection on a showing that it is justified by a reasonable government
interest.
9Frank v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 365-6.
'ld. at 366.
11Id. at 373.
"Justice Douglas argued that the distinction between civil and criminal searches in
a case such as this one is invalid because failure to abate the nuisance gives rise
to criminal prosecution. He quotes extensively from Judge Prettyman in District of
Columbia v. Little, supra note 4. Justice Douglas also gives a different interpretation
to the history relied upon by Frankfurter to show the intended scope of the Fourth
Amendment concluding that the framers intended to include administrative searches.
Frank v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 376-382.
"Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 705 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-5 (1948).
"Frank v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 380-381.
"Id at 382.
6 In Baltimore, while inspections averaged more than 30,000 per year from 1954 to
1958, refusals to permit inspection averaged only one per year. Douglas stated: "One
rebel a year is not too great a price to pay for maintaining our guarantee of civil
rights in full vigor." Id at 384.
1967]
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One month after the Frank decision, the dissenters showed their de-
termination to keep the issue of administrative searches alive by forcing a
decision in Ohio Ex Rel. Eaton v. Price,17 a case similar to Frank v. Mary-
land. Although the Eaton case has no weight as precedent, since it was
affirmed by an equally divided Court, it did point out a broadening of the
Frank decision. In Eaton there was no reason to believe that a violation
of the health codes existed on the premises of the defendant, nor that the
inspection was part of any routine plan. i8 In the Frank case a half ton of
straw, trash, and rat feces were found in the defendant's yard, and a
neighbor had complained of rats.19 Despite the distinction, four members
of the Supreme Court--Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whit-
taker-found the Frank case "to be completely controlling upon the Ohio
decision [Eaton v. Price] .120
From the time of the Eaton v. Price decision in 1959 to Camara v. San
Francisco in 1967, the United States Supreme Court did not consider the
constitutionality of warrantless inspections by municipal safety and health
inspectors.21 By the narrowest possible majority, such warrantless in-
spections had been approved. But three signals for possible change could
be seen. First, the Frank rationale was broadened by Eaton v. Price. Sec-
ond, Justice Douglas argued in the Frank dissent that warrantless admin-
istrative searches would encourage police to collude with administrative
inspectors to search for evidence of crime. This threat became reality in
another 1959 Baltimore case in which lottery tickets were seized under the
guise of a health inspection.22 Finally, two justices who had voted with
the majority in Frank v. Maryland-Frankfurter and Whittaker-were no
longer on the court.
23
.7360 U.S. 246 (1959). There was evidence that this move was to embarass the
majority. In addition to being so soon after the Frank decision, the dissenters
knew that Justice Stewart would almost certainly absent himself since his father
was a member of the Ohio Supreme Court at the time Eaton v. Price was reviewed.
The probable result would be an equally divided court. See Landynski, supra note 2,
at 253. The four Justices who voted against noting probable jurisdiction took the
unprecedented step of explaining their views before the case was tried on its merits.
Justice Brennen answered lecturing them for their indiscretion. Eaton v. Price, supra,
at 247-249.
18Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1958).
Frank v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 361.
23Eaton v. Price, supra note 17, at 248.
"For cases involving the constitutionality of searches for evidence of crime during
this period, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1962).
nMaryland v. Pettiford, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, DAILY RECORD (Dec. 16,
1959). In this case a police officer assigned to the Sanitation Department gained
entrance to a home without a warrant for the purpose of spying on an illegal lottery
while ostensibly making a health inspection. Lottery slips were seized and, over
defendant's objection, were received in evidence in a criminal trial. The Supreme
Bench of Baltimore City excluded the evidence and reversed the conviction. See
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 243
n. 2 (1960). It can be argued, of course, that such application of the exclusionary
rule diminishes the importance of Douglas's argument that individual rights will be
seriously infringed by collusion between health inspectors and police.
'Justice White replaced Whittaker in 1962. Arthur Goldberg replaced Justice Frank-
furter in 1962, and Justice Fortas replaced Goldberg in 1965. The four justices who
had dissented to the decisions of Frank v. Maryland and Eaton v. Price-Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan-were joined by Justices
[Vol. 29
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THE CAMARA DECISION
The question to be decided in Camara was whether administrative in-
spections should be controlled by the Fourth Amendment. In theory each
individual has a right to the privacy of his "person, house, papers and ef-
fects." And this privacy cannot be invaded except on a showing of probable
cause to warrant an intrusion. From a more pragmatic viewpoint, however,
the requirements for a search warrant based upon the traditional re-
quirements of "probable cause" would seriously hamper the effective ad-
ministration of sanitation and safety codes. 24 Further, the inspections in-
volve a relatively limited invasion of privacy since they are not personal
in nature. The significance of such an invason, as a practical matter, may
not be worth the expense and delay of obtaining a warrant.
Camara arose under a section of the San Francisco Municipal Code
stating that inspectors of administrative departments "shall, upon presen-
tation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times,
any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty im-
posed upon them by the Municipal Code."'25 After being informed by a
building inspector that a building occupancy permit did not allow resi-
dential use of the ground floor, Ronald Camara refused to allow inspec-
tion of his ground floor apartment without a search warrant. He was
arrested and released on bail. California courts denied his petition for
hearing and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court.26 Speaking
for the majority, Justice White re-examined the basic arguments of the
Frank majority. First, he disagreed that the interests at stake in munici-
pal inspection cases are merely "peripheral" to the Fourth Amendment.
"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private prop-
erty are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the indi-
vidual is suspected of criminal behavior. ' '2 7 Secondly, even though the
inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the indi-
vidual occupant," the occupant has no way of knowing if enforcement of
the municipal code requires inspection of his premises or if the inspector
is acting under proper authorization. 28 Finally, the public need for war-
rantless administrative searches is not conclusive. "It has nowhere been
urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not
White and Fortas to make up the majority in Camara v. San Francisco. The dis-
senters were the three remaining Justices of the Frank majority -Justices Harlan,
Clark and Stewart.
24The requirement of "probable cause" is discussed more fully below. See text at
notes 33 and 34, infra.
2SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL CODE § 503. This code does not have the "cause"
requrement of the Baltimore code. See note 8, supra. Although Frank v. Maryland
can arguably be distinguished from Camara on this basis, the Court attacks the
entire Frank decision.
"He sought a writ prohibiting his prosecution in California Municipal Court. Cali-
fornia Superior Court denied the writ, the California District Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.
'Camara v. City of San Francisco, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1732 (1967).
28Id.
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achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant re-
quirement. '29 Following Douglas' dissent in Frank, Justice White strongly
attacked the argument that the warrant for sanitaton inspection would be
merely a "synthetic warrant":
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to
search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental
interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard.30
In the dissent to Camara Justice Clark followed closely the position of
the majority in Frank v. Maryland. The inspections, he insisted, were con-
ducted in a reasonable manner in response to the great need for health
and safety inspections. Since the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those
searches which are "unreasonable", there is no necessity for a warrant
to conduct a health or safety inspection. "Why the ceremony, the delay,
the expense, the abuse of the search warrant? In my view that will not
only destroy its integrity but will degrade the magistrate issuing them
and soon bring disrepute not only to the practice but upon the judicial
process. "31 Justice Clark further argued that the number of refusals to
permit entry without a warrant would increase greatly if warrantless
inspections were made voluntary.3 2
ANALYSIS OF CAMARA
The problem facing the Supreme Court in Camara was one of constitutional
vagueness. Since historical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment did
not provide an answer, the Court resorted to an examination of the con-
flicting social interests involved. In Frank v. Maryland the Court balanced
the scales in favor of the public need for compliance with minimum health
and safety standards at the expense of the individual right to privacy.
Camara v. San Francisco tipped the scales the other way, but not so far as
to entirely defeat one side for the elevation of the other. The aim of the
Court in Camara is to protect the individual's right to privacy without
greatly hampering the effective administration of sanitation and safety
programs.
The facts necessary to show "probable cause" for an adminstrative
inspection are not the same as for the search for evidence of crime. Al-
though the criteria for determining probable cause to search for evidence
of crime vary with particular circumstances, a general test can be stated
as follows: Whether facts and circumstances before the issuing officer
are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that
a crime has been, or is being, committed on the premises.3 3 The require-
2id. at 1733.
'Id. at 1736.
11Id at 1745.
"For support Clark cites statistics from a voluntary inspection program in Portland,
Oregon, where entry without a warrant was refused in one out of six cases. Under
the Baltimore Code, refusals were significantly fewer. See note 16, supra.
OSee Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). See also
79 C.J.S. Search and Seizure § 74(b) (1952).
[Vol. 29
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 29 [1967], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol29/iss1/4
RECENT DECISIONS
ment is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possi-
bility. Probable cause to issue a warrant for an administrative inspec-
tion, however, does not require a reasonable belief in the commission of
crime, but proof that a valid public interest justifies the contemplated
intrusion.3
4
In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a war-
rant for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed
in terms of reasonable goals of code enforcement. 35
By the terms of the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must
particularly describe the "place to be searched" and the "things to be
seized." It is necessary that a search warrant pursuant to a criminal in-
vestigation contain such descriptions,36 but the warrant authorizing an
administrative inspection apparently need not be so specific. The aim of
administrative inspections is to secure general compliance with minimum
physical standards for private property, rather than seize particular evi-
dence of crime in a particular dwelling. The standards to determine prob-
able cause for an administrative inspection, therefore, will vary with the
municipal program being enforced, and "may be based upon the passage
of time, the nature of the building (e.g. a multi-family apartment house),
or the condition of the entire area; but they will not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. ' '37
The majority of the Court in Frank v. Maryland did not want to
reduce the requirements for "probable cause" of an administrative in-
spection below those required for the search pursuant to criminal inves-
tigation because the resulting warrant would be "synthetic. '38 To satis-
fy the probable cause requirement as set forth by the Court in Camara,
it will apparently be sufficient to affirm, under oath, that a portion of the
city is in danger of epidemic or fire unless each dwelling in the area is
inspected and made to conform to the minimum standards of sanitation
and safety.39 Is the valid public interest for the intrusion so easy to show
that the issuance of the search warrant under the "probable cause"
requirements of Camara would be merely a ceremony delaying the search
'"If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Camara v. San
Francisco, supra note 27, at 1736.
"sId at 1734.
3See United States v. Alexander, 202 F. Supp. 209 (D.Minn. 1961). See also 79 C.J.S.
Search and Seizure § 75 (1952).
37Camara v. San Francisco, supra note 27, at 1736.
"See note 11, supra.
"The Court in Camara does not specifically address itself to the kind of situation
raised by the facts of the Frank case where the delapidated condition of Frank's
house and the pile of straw and rat feces in the yard gave the inspector cause to
believe that Frank's particular dwelling was the source of rats in the neighborhood.
In such a situation at the present time, however, it seems clear that a warrant
could be obtained under the guidelines of the Camara decision if the inspector would
show either his reasonable belief that a violation of the health code exists within
Frank's house, or that public interest demands an inspection of Frank's house and
houses nearby if the people in that area of the city are to be protected from disease.
1967]
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and producing a "synthetic" search warrant? It will not be difficult for
health and safety officials to show that a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion contemplated because public health and safety are the cen-
tral concerns of their work. In this sense the warrant will be synthetic.
But even with the reduced requirements for probable cause, the warrant
for an administrative inspection will serve to show the occupant that the
actions of the inspector are authorized; and that he is not conducting the
search on a personal whim, but on a showing to a judicial officer that
reasonable code enforcement demands inspection of the dwelling.
One of the jusifications urged by the Frank majority for permitting
administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant was that
such inspections "touch at most upon the periphery of the important in-
terests safeguarded" by the Fourth Amendment. 40 Under this view the
administrative inspection does not fall within the safeguards of the
Fourth Amendment because it is not a search for evidence of criminal
action. The Camara majority disagrees. Like most regulatory laws, fire,
health and housing codes are enforced by criminal process.41 It is not a
crime to allow the condition of one's dwelling to fall below the minimum
standards of a health or safety code,42 but failure to alleviate the condi-
tion within a specified time when ordered to do so by an inspector and
refusal to permit inspection are crimes. They are punishable by fine or
even jail sentence.
At the present time there exist two distinguishable types of search
warrants and the possible development of a third. Where search pur-
suant to criminal investigation is contemplated, probable cause require-
ments are those traditionally required.43 To issue a warrant for an ad-
ministrative health or safety inspection when entry is refused by the
owner or occupant of a dwelling, probable cause must be weighed in
terms of the reasonableness and validity of the public interest protected
by the inspection. These warrants are issued by a judicial officer. A
possible third type of warrant is the administrative search warrant issued
by an official of the administrative department concerned with the
search. The development of such a warrant is suggested by Justice Clark
in his dissent to Camara.
Under the probable cause standard laid down by the Court, it
appears to me that the issuance of warrants could more appro-
priately be the function of the agency involved than that of the
magistrate. This would also relieve magistrates of an intolerable
"OFrank v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 367.
4"In Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court held that the
exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings as it does to criminal prosecutions
because of the criminal nature of the penalty imposed in a forfeiture proceeding.
The situation is analogous to the fines imposed for refusing to permit an ad-
ministrative inspection.
"For this reason the term "search for evidence of crime" has been used here to
distinguish the search pursuant to strictly criminal investigation from the admini-
strative health or safety inspection.
4379 C.J.S., supra note 33.
[Vol. 29
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burden. It is therefore unfortunate that the Court fails to pass on
the validity of the use of administrative warrants. 44
Present state and municipal codes authorizing administrative
searches of dwellings do not provide for a warrant procedure. 45 Hence,
the validity of a search warrant issued by a municipal commissioner of
health, or similar official of an administrative agency, on probable cause
requirements consistent with Camara remains an open question. It seems
most likely, however, that the administrative search warrant would not
be allowed because the party warranting the need to search would not
be sufficiently disinterested to insure the complete protection of Fourth
Amendment interests.
CONCLUSION
Camara sets the constitutional guidelines for administrative searches
by inspectors of sanitation and health departments: a statute requiring
a person to submit to a warrantless inspection of his premises violates the
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches. The initial
effect of the decision will be to cause changes in hundreds of state and
municipal statutes. Much confusion will likely occur until such statutes,
inspection procedures, and warrant procedures are made to conform.
But many questions remain unanswered. How great a showing of "prob-
able cause" will a magistrate require? Will the magistrate apply "prob-
able cause" requirements consistent with Camara? Since the Court does
not specifically pass on the validity of administrative warrants, will such
warrants ever be allowed? Will the number of persons requiring a war-
rant before allowing inspection of their premises significantly increase?
And will the pragmatic considerations of the expense and delay involved
in obtaining a warrant eventually outweight the need for protection of
individual rights?
Until the Camara decision, the Fourth Amendment was construed so
that a man suspected of crime had a right to protection against search
of his home without a warrant, but the privacy of the law-abiding citizen
could be invaded without a warrant by an administrative inspector. The
Court in Camara required a warrant to inspect the home of a law-abiding
citizen if he does not consent to a warrantless search. There were two
conflicting objectives before the Court: (1) the desire to bring the ad-
ministrative inspection within the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
"Camara v. San Francisco, supra note 27, at 1742 n. 1.
45Montana Statute permits the Board of Pardons, an administrative body, to issue
a warrant for the arrest of a released prisoner for violations of the terms of his
release. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-9838. Under the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act, an arrest warrant may be issued by the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1967).
The validity of such a warrant was upheld by the Supreme Court in Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). The Abel case involved a search pursuant to deportation,
not health standards; the warrant was for arrest, rather than search; and Abel
was an alien, not a citizen. The case is used here merely to point to the validity of
administrative action, without the intervening hand of a magistrate, in the field
of search and seizure.
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ment, and (2) the social need for effective sanitation and safety pro-
grams. To accomplish both of these ends while requiring the type of
warrant traditionally known in the search for evidence of crime was not
possible. The strictness of the "probable cause" standards required in a
search pursuant to criminal investigation would make a warrant diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to obtain. Even if this were possible, such a
method would be unlikely to permit a search of all the buildings in a par-
ticular district-a procedure which is necessary if an area inspection is
to be effective. The Court in Camara solves the dilemma by setting re-
duced standards of "probable cause" to warrant an administrative in-
spection. The Camara solution is reasonable and a long standing constitu-
tional question is finally settled, but the resolution of the practical
administrative problems created by the decision will not be found quickly.
JAMES P. MURPHY, JR.
INSURANCE: LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR REFUSAL TO SETTLE
WITHIN THE POLICY LIMITS. Plaintiff owned a building which was insured
for general liability by the defendant. Plaintiff's tenant fell through a
stairway which was negligently maintained. The tenant, who suffered
severe mental and physical injuries, brought an action against the plaintiff
claiming $400,000 in damages but subsequently offering to settle for $9,000.
Although the insurance policy had a limit of $10,000, the insurer refused
the offer of settlement. The tenant pursued her action against the plain-
tiff and recovered a judgment of $101,000. The insurer paid the $10,000
policy limit and disclaimed further liability. Plaintiff then brought this
action to recover the excess of the judgment over the policy limits from
the insurer. Held, by refusing the resonable settlement offer, the de-
fendant breached its duty to act in good faith and was liable for the entire
judgment against the plaintiff. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967). 1
In the instant case, the insurer paid $116,0002 more than its policy
limit because it refused to settle the claim within the limits of the policy.
This case illustrates the conflict between the interests of the insurer and
insured, which arises whenever an injured party offers to settle within
the policy limits.: Liability insurance contracts require the insurer to pay
only the sums which the law determines the insurer owes to the injured
party.4 Often it serves the insurer's financial interests to refuse to settle
because a subsequent court action may determine: (a) that there is no
'See also Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., Inc., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967).
2The insurer paid a total of $126,000: $10,000 policy limits, $91,000 excess judgment,
and $25,000 for mental suffering caused by the insurer's refusal to settle.
'Radcliff v. Franklin National Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002, 1011 (1956).
lid.
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